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“Film Censorship as a Good Business in Colonial Korea: Profiteering From 
Hollywood's First Golden Age, 1926–1936” 
Brian Yecies, University of Wollongong, Australia 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Between 1926 and 1936, cinema in colonial Korea was a vibrant business, involving the 
production of domestic films and the distribution and exhibition of American, British, 
Chinese, French, German, Italian, and Russian films. During this decade, the first golden age 
of American cinema in Korea, Hollywood films overwhelmingly dominated the Korean 
market. Korea was an important territory that Hollywood used in its overall global expansion 
campaign. Amid this globalization operation, the Government-General of Chōsen’s film 
censorship apparatus was a financially self-sustaining operation. It paid for its operation by 
profiteering from the application of more than 6,700 American and 630 other countries’ 
feature and non-feature films, a vast majority of which were approved with minor, if any, 
censorship changes. The Government-General’s systematization of film censorship policies 
was intended to obstruct Communist, revolutionary, and later, socialist themes rather than 
“Western” themes—at least until the late 1930s, when the Japanese Department of Home 
Affairs began banning the import of American films and the Government-General intensified 
the suppression of Korean culture. 
 
 
On April 2, 2005, a conference panel at the fifty-seventh annual meeting of the 
Association for Asian Studies (AAS) focused on the Japanese Censorship System and Korean 
Responses in Colonial Korea. Collectively, the panel attempted to proffer a deeper 
understanding of the colonial period by showcasing the multifaceted ways Koreans 
negotiated hegemony with imperial Japan, and more specifically censorship policies, which 
were at the center of the colonial venture.1  
The particular focus and timing of this formative AAS panel provide an explicit 
wake-up call about the scholarly and historical significance of censorship studies and its 
status as an emerging area of research. Scholars must pursue a plethora of new directions and 
paradigms in order to gain a more rigorous understanding of Japan’s larger imperial cultural 
agenda. Given the challenge of scarce primary sources, among other research limitations, this 
is no easy task. Primary sources do exist. In this article, I refer to my recent discovery of a 
small but diverse collection of Japanese, Korean, and English language archive documents 
concerning film policy and censorship in colonial Korea. To my knowledge, these documents 
have never been discussed in English or Korean.2  
This article attempts to contribute to the larger ongoing discussions and analyses of 
the Korean cinema, and to move beyond the conventional and nationalist claims reiterated in 
many Korean and English-language sources. There is a rich and complex story here, which 
revolves around the activities of the Government-General of Chōsen (Chōsen Sōtokufu in 
Japanese), Hollywood distributors, and Korean filmmakers, and their impact on the film 
industry in colonial Korea. Each profited from film censorship in different ways. Specifically, 
I focus on the colonial film censorship apparatus in Korea and the dominant role that 
Hollywood motion pictures played in the Korean market during the 1920s and 1930s.3  
In 1933, a new censorship building was constructed in the Government-General 
complex in Seoul with state-of-the-art silent and sound film projection equipment compatible 
with all film formats (sizes, sprocket dimensions, etc.) from around the world.4 According to 
detailed Japanese censorship statistics and other archive documents discussed in this article, 
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the new facility cost ¥50,475.5 It was built to meet the demands of an astounding increase in 
the number of films being censored in colonial Korea. More than a quarter-million yen in 
total fees, generated from thousands of censorship applications of feature and nonfeature 
films between 1926 and 1936, helped to pay for the Government-General of Chōsen’s new 
censorship building.6 During this time, the total number of films censored was slightly more 
than 24,000 items (107,736 rolls equalling more than 25,300,000 meters), and total revenues 
soared to ¥262,080.7 Censorship application fees collected by the Government-General of 
Chōsen between April 1, 1935 and March 31, 1936 alone amounted to ¥29,568—about 11 
percent of the total fees collected over this decade. The Government-General’s decision to 
build a new facility came at an opportune time.8  
Within this environment, Japanese, Korean, and American distributors contributed 
immensely to the livelihood of the censorship apparatus—both as a process and an authority. 
Japanese, Korean, and American distribution agents based in both Tokyo and Seoul applied 
for and received censorship approval to exhibit 7,376 feature films—6,737 from Hollywood 
and 639 from other countries—between 1926 and 1936. These figures rise to a combined 
total of 9,404 foreign films after including nonfeature films (documentary, commercial, and 
propaganda). More than 90 percent of the films submitted were Hollywood films. As other 
studies briefly note, the Censorship Board often used the tactic of granting censorship 
approval to a film and then turning around and prohibiting it from being screened. A number 
of different reasons, such as fire hazard or threat to local order, were used to block some 
films from reaching their intended audiences.9 Although it is unclear exactly how many films 
were actually screened, it is clear that Hollywood contributed substantially to film culture in 
Korea. In fact, the American film industry helped to subsidize the advancement of the 
Government-General of Chōsen’s censorship apparatus.  
To this end, I see Hollywood as an unintended “pro-imperial Japanese collaborator” 
(ilche hyŏmnyŏkcha in Korean)—not in the finger-pointing and witch-hunting ways outlined 
in other studies,10 but implicitly, by legitimizing Japanese colonial authority and financially 
supporting the occupation of Korea. I begin by examining the Government-General of 
Chōsen’s film censorship policy, and the ways in which its development helped the Motion 
Picture Producers and Distributors Association of America (MPPDAA) reach its goal of 
simultaneously profiting from the Korean market and expanding Hollywood’s worldwide 
domination.11  
 
 
Systematizing Film Censorship 
 
In 1916, Hasegawa Yoshimichi became Governor-General of Chōsen (Sōtoku in 
Japanese). A notorious achievement of his administration was the promulgation of a set of 
film regulations, which attempted to restrict not only the exhibition of foreign films in Korea 
but also the production of local films.12 It may be that the Government-General anticipated 
the coming and development of film activity in the Korean market. The origins of film policy 
in Korea and its later restrictions on the expression of culture can be traced back to 
regulations enacted by Hasegawa on August 1, 1918.13 Motion Picture Regulations formed in 
Japan proper in 1917 provided the basis for this treatment.14 Policy amendments occurred in 
1920, 1922, 1926, 1928, 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1940. Major revisions usually occurred 
shortly after a new governor-general was appointed. Cinema’s popularity in Korea and its 
power as an influential mass medium rose in tandem with the colonial authority’s desire to 
regulate many aspects of both the film industry and Korean culture.15 
Micromanaging the film industry in Korea was a governmental priority because film 
was thought to possess an influential power over society and culture. Indeed, Japanese 
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authorities had capitalized on the media as a propaganda tool as far back as 1868, when the 
early Meiji press policy was formed. Since this early date, the Japanese government, as well 
as private industry in Japan, had understood that the mass media were a powerful tool, which 
could communicate ideological messages to the masses.16 It was no accident, then, that the 
Government-General applied these early regulatory precautions to the exhibition, 
distribution, and later, production of films in the Korean market.17 
After 1918, every exhibitor, local producer, and foreign distribution agent had to 
apply to the nearest provincial police station for a permit to screen every film. Guidelines 
established two film-rating categories—the first for films suitable for audiences younger than 
fifteen years of age, and a second for adults (older than fifteen). Men and women were 
prohibited from sitting together unless they were married. Any film, domestic (Korean and 
Japanese) or foreign, which sensationalized adultery, arson, crime, murder, or attacks on 
authorities, was prohibited.18 The Police Bureau (Keimukyoku in Japanese), and not the actual 
censorship regulations, determined what part of a film’s content was “inappropriate” and 
“injurious to the public order, customs or health”.19 The showing of murder, torture, brutality, 
antireligious themes, theft, nudity, jailbreak, and revolutionary or politically independent 
ideas that might undermine governmental authority was considered conducive to “dangerous 
thoughts”.20 The provincial police stations, which oversaw film censorship at the local level, 
censored (cut) all films that overtly contained these types of scenes and/or revolutionary ideas 
and images.  
Provincial police chiefs also determined scenario/script revisions and established 
location exceptions/restrictions. They had the power to close cinemas and/or disrupt 
screenings of films for violating censorship regulations and to punish the perpetrators. 
Exhibited films experienced varying forms of regulatory attention in an ad hoc system that 
varied from district to district. A lack of uniformity between different police chiefs, who may 
or may not have been susceptible to bribery, continued to be a problem throughout the late 
1910s and early 1920s. Censorship was a crude process because each province inspected 
films and administered punishments for violations in different ways.21 Unlike the legal 
precedents, which were set in the courts, the regulatory efforts and procedures followed by 
individual (provincial) police chiefs and stations had little objectivity or few unified standards 
across multiple regions. Hence, local police stations regulated the exhibition and distribution 
of films with their heavy fists rather than the censor’s careful snip.  
Once through the censorship process, domestic and foreign films, including multiple 
copies of the same film, received a formal stamp of approval. Written exhibition permits 
specified the period of time and number of screenings allowed. A film that failed to receive a 
screening permit could be re-edited and resubmitted, with additional censorship application 
fees, to the same provincial police station. The collection of these multiple censorship fees 
soon gave rise to a stronger censorship apparatus by providing opportunities to reap a steady 
income. In this way, the film censorship process and apparatus in Korea was financially self-
sustaining.22 
The new film censorship regime was enacted in response to the global activities of the 
MPPDAA, which was helping the major and minor Hollywood studios expand their 
distribution networks and territories throughout the world and, more specifically, in Asia. 
Around this time, markets in Asia, and Japan in particular, were no longer considered “junk 
markets” because of the potential to earn lucrative profits from film rental contracts.23 
Hollywood distributors simply desired to expand and maximize their profits throughout the 
“Orient,” an increasingly important market for the United States after World War I due to 
distribution opportunities lost in European markets.24  
 In August 1919, Admiral Saitō Makoto replaced Hasegawa as the governor-general of 
Chōsen. Government offices and ministries throughout Korea began to encourage Koreans to 
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support Japan’s colonial and thus nationalistic agenda, which in 1937 eventually became 
known as the assimilationist slogan: “Japan and Korea as one country” (Naisen ittai).25 
Surprisingly, however, Governor Saitō launched a new cultural policy designed to relax 
Japanese administrative control over Korean cultural and artistic activities across the 
peninsula. This was Saitō’s first “gift” to Korea. It seems that Saitō was interested in altering 
the image of the Japanese Empire after the March First independence movement in 1919 and 
rendering the administrative operation in Korea more efficient.26 Writers, actors, filmmakers, 
and theater entrepreneurs took advantage of this new opportunity and began developing or 
negotiating spaces for the expression of Korean culture. This was a hopeful time for Korean 
intellectuals and artists, as cinema became a “node of cultural construction.”27 Allowing 
Koreans to gain film production training and experience—or at least not entirely preventing 
them from doing so—encouraged the creation of a Korean cinema. Hence, it was not an 
accident that one of the earliest Korean films—The Righteous Revenge or Loyal Revenge 
(Ŭirichŏk kutu), a multimedia kino-drama—was made in 1919.28 
On August 1, 1926, Governor-General Saitō’s administration launched a new film 
policy—Government-General Law No. 59—which became Korea’s first systematized, 
national film censorship regulations. Law No. 59 mirrored the regulations ratified in 1925 in 
Japan proper. The whole empire now had a cohesive approach to film censorship, giving the 
minister of Home Affairs a larger degree of power. The Japanese government, through the 
Government-General’s administration, was able to control the exhibition of domestic and 
foreign films with stricter central censorship regulations while delegating regulatory power to 
provincial police authorities who could concentrate on whether or not a film was detrimental 
to public peace and cultural customs on a localized level. Socially acceptable films avoided 
violating the dignity of the emperor and were “free from impediment to the maintenance of 
public peace, custom, or hygiene”.29 Law No. 59 thus reinforced a kind of 
international/national/local hierarchy, which in reality was not always easy to control 
completely.  
Along with Law No. 59, Saitō created a national Censorship Board (Kenetsu iinkai). 
The board began methodically to record explicit data concerning the total number of 
applications, reels, reel lengths, script and reel rejections, types of restrictions, and total fees 
of all domestic and international feature and nonfeature films censored. According to the 
Film Daily Year Book—one of the key sources in the United States for international film 
trade data and news—the MPPDAA immediately became concerned about the stricter 
censorship’s implications for the distribution of Hollywood films in the Japanese imperial 
market, especially in Korea.30 The MPPDAA’s fears, however, were unfounded, as the 
censorship apparatus rejected very few American films. Hollywood films were warmly 
accepted, along with their associated censorship application fees. 
 Saitō’s second “gift” to Korea and especially to the nascent Korean film industry, was 
his decision to enable or at least not prevent Koreans from submitting more than 450 
domestic Korean and Japanese and more than 2,100 foreign films for censorship approval. In 
this way, Saitō liberated the film industry as he did other manufacturing and production 
industries, and encouraged an expanding consumer class with resources that supported local 
filmmakers and entertainment entrepreneurs.31 Hence, film culture in Korea throughout the 
Japanese colonial period flourished. As discussed below, individuals and groups of Korean 
film people, perhaps similarly to the Korean business elite, played a noteworthy role in 
Korean cinema’s growth and development in previously unrecognized ways.32 
 Numerous film genres, along with an active field of critical and fan-based film 
magazines and newspaper articles about local and international cinema, contributed to a film-
literate society.33 Feature and short films as well as kino-dramas were intended as 
entertainment. Education films (kyōiku eiga), business/public relations advertisements 
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(senden or kōkoku eiga) from institutions such as the Meiji Confectionary Company (Meiji 
Seika) and Tokyo Electric Light Company (Tokyo Dentō), and documentary films 
(dokyumentarii eiga) were used for nonentertainment purposes.34 Other film genres, which 
involved a mix of both educational and entertainment purposes, included: battle records 
(senki eiga), cartoons, current-events (jiji eiga), industrial, newsreels (nyūsu eiga), public 
(kōekiteki senden eiga), record (kiroku eiga), sanitary, science (kagaku eiga), small-gauge 
(kogata eiga), sport, tourist, and war conditions films (senkyō eiga).35 The three most 
prevalent types of films were cultural films (bunka eiga), public films, and short- and feature-
length propaganda films (puropaganda or senden geki eiga). Cultural films aimed to alert 
Japanese and foreign audiences to the uniqueness of Japanese culture.36 Public films were 
imperialistic films containing actual war footage. Propaganda films often presented action, 
adventure, and espionage narratives containing imperial and overt nationalistic Naisen ittai 
(Naesŏn ilch’e in Korean) themes.37 Naisen ittai sentiments in both the public and 
propaganda films were used in Korea to serve the colonial agenda and act as inspirational 
recruitment tools for the war effort.  
After 1926, nonfeature films designed to educate Korean and Japanese audiences 
were exempt from paying censorship application fees. The fees generated from an abundance 
of Hollywood feature films thus helped to subsidize the screenings of nonfeature and 
commercial films. Around the same time, the Government-General began requesting that a 
higher number of propaganda films be screened in Korea. Japanese distributors eagerly 
supplied so-called public films, which were used to educate the public. Public films were 
regarded highly by the Censorship Board and were exempt from application fees. This 
provided a drive for Japanese film companies to increase the production of cultural and 
educational propaganda films, which in turn promoted assimilationist ideology to Koreans 
and supported the Japanese film industry. 
Censorship application fees were based solely on film length. In Japan, for example, a 
short, 1,000 meter film cost the applicant (the film owner or rental agent) ¥16.66, or 
approximately $8 US dollars. A feature-length film of 2,400 meters cost ¥39.98 or $19 US 
dollars.38 The fees for censoring additional copies of the same film amounted to 40 percent of 
the cost of the first copy. Major studios such as Universal, Fox, and Paramount often sent 
multiple copies of the same film to a single market in order to arrange simultaneous 
screenings in different capital cities. Applying for re-censorship also incurred fees of 40 
percent of whatever applicants paid the first time around for the first copy of the film. 
Newsreels and other current event films—often inspected by provincial authorities rather 
than a centralized censorship board—were charged one sen per length of three meters. Given 
the considerable monetary requirement involved in applying for censorship approval in Japan 
proper, only the more financially stable organizations, especially the ones that survived the 
Great Depression, could afford to distribute and exhibit a large number of films in Japan. 
This probably explains why, between the mid- to late-1920s, films made by the major 
Hollywood studios occupied from 22 to 30 percent share of the Japanese market while 
European films only attained about 3 percent.39 There was no apparent reason for the 
Censorship Board to treat Hollywood films harshly.  
By comparison, the Government-General of Chōsen’s censorship apparatus charged 
50 to 60 percent less than applicants paid in Japan. Censorship application fees in Korea were 
one sen per meter of footage for the first (original) print and one-half of one sen per meter of 
footage for duplicate copies.40 These considerably lower fees were a huge economic incentive 
for distributors of Hollywood films to flood the Korean market with their products well into 
the 1930s. In fact, the share of Hollywood films in the Korean market remained higher than 
in Japan proper, reaching heights of 40 percent of the total length of film actually screened in 
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Korea. The percentages of total audiences at American films, as well as the number of film 
rentals, also exceeded those in Japan.41 
In August 1934, according to the American consulate-general in Seoul, U.S. films 
dominated the motion picture screens in Korea, with as much as 62 percent of the market. 
More than half of Seoul’s major cinemas were screening foreign—primarily American—
films, which outnumbered all other countries’ films five-fold. Although box office figures are 
not readily available in this groundwork study, the number of German, British, French, and 
Russian films followed Hollywood films, in that order.42 During this time, Fox, Paramount, 
Warner Bros.–First National, Universal, independent agent J. H. Morris and others who 
represented Columbia, MGM, RKO, and United Artists—all controlling members of the 
MPPDAA—had direct distribution offices in Seoul. Korea was unquestionably a key territory 
for Hollywood distributors.43 There was no better market in Asia for Hollywood films than 
colonial Korea.44 
Hollywood’s First Golden Age in Korea 
 
The growth of the censorship apparatus in Korea began with the increasing Japanese 
police presence in the colony, which grew stronger during Admiral Saitō’s regime.45 As 
described, police troops played a central role in the enforcement of film policies. Aspiring 
Korean filmmakers, as well as the MPPDAA, began to witness the tightening of film 
regulations by provincial police bureaus. At the same time, Japanese film studios were eager 
to utilize the Korean exhibition market, which included hundreds of thousands of Japanese 
citizens who had begun migrating to Korea after the annexation in 1910.46 
Out of an approximate total of 31,100 reels of feature films censored between 1926 
and 1936, a paltry 52 reels were rejected. In addition, a mere 537 scenarios (or 8 percent) of 
all 6,737 U.S. feature films censored during these two decades were restricted from being 
screened. Film parts cut for reasons of public peace and order (kōan) were 4,668 meters or 
six-hundredths of one percent of the 7,646,741 total meters of film censored. Similarly, an 
insignificant 6,604 meters of film parts were cut for reasons of manners and customs/public 
morals (fūzoku). Out of all 626 feature films submitted in 1936 alone to the Censorship 
Board, not a single film was rejected outright.47 As busy as it was, the Censorship Board 
seemed to accept and approve of the contents of nearly all U.S. films. That is, U.S. films were 
not seen as jeopardizing public peace, displaying immoral manners, or marring imperial 
Japan’s “good and beautiful customs” (ryōfū bizoku).48 
The relative ease of being passed by the Censorship Board made the distribution of 
films in Korea extremely convenient for the Hollywood distribution agents/exchanges. It may 
be that Hollywood distributors exploited the censor’s motives in order to submit every 
possible print for exhibition. In turn, the Government-General saw an opportunity to profit 
from thousands of would-be censorship applications and their associated fees.49 Censorship 
applications were warmly accepted regardless of the quality of the print(s) in question. In this 
symbiotic nod-nod-wink-wink relationship, neither Hollywood nor the Censorship Board had 
much to lose. Moreover, the overabundance of American films in the Korean market during 
the 1920s and 1930s goaded Korean filmmakers. Although these connections are difficult to 
prove, the boom in Korea’s silent film production—its first golden age—corresponded with 
the deluge of Hollywood films in Korea. This was undoubtedly the first golden age for the 
American cinema in Korea and the larger Asian territory.50 However, the openness with 
which American films were received was afforded only to certain types of Korean films. 
According to comments made by the Bureau of Police Affairs in 1935 during the 
Sixty-ninth Imperial Parliament, censorship in Korea had to be “strict” (gensei) and “careful” 
(neniri), because Korean customs and thought patterns were different from those in Japan 
(Chōsen no fūzoku shūkan wa naichi to kotonaru).51 In effect, the assimilationist approach 
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was easier said than done. Censorship laws restricted freedoms of expression throughout the 
empire and suppressed films that criticized society and/or glorified revolution.52 One of the 
primary aims of the Censorship Board was to suppress Korean independence and Communist 
themes, which criticized society and/or glorified revolution. One would have expected the 
censorship regime to target socialist themes too. Nevertheless, between the late 1920s and 
mid-1930s, members of the Korean Artist Proletarian Federation (KAPF) in Korea and 
Nippon Artist Proletarian Federation (NAPF) in Japan made a small number of socially 
conscious films.53 For almost seven years, the Japanese Home Ministry and Government-
General of Chōsen overlooked these interrelated groups of filmmakers—until films with 
socialist themes were stifled by the so-called cultural crackdown at the end of Governor-
General Ugaki Kazushige and the beginning of Governor-General Minami Jirō’s regime in 
1936.54 
Without question, historical/period (jidai eiga), modern/contemporary (gendai eiga), 
and documentary films made in Korea by all-Korean and/or part-Korean and part-Japanese 
production crews experienced censorship problems.55 Titles that sounded overtly 
revolutionary were changed. Scenes too critical of the Japanese Empire were cut and/or re-
shot. One of the first cases of the censorship of Korean films occurred in April 1925, when 
the Censorship Board changed the name of the film Dark Light (Amkwang) to Make-up of 
God (Sinŭi Chang), and forced Japanese director Takasa Kancho (whose Korean name was 
Wang Pil-yŏl) to reduce its length. The next film censored was director Yi Kyŏng-son’s King 
of the Mountain Bandits (Sanch’aewang), produced in September 1926 by the Kerim Film 
Association (Kerim yŏnghwa hyŏphoe)—an all-Korean film company. Authorities forced the 
Kerim Film Association to cut Sanch’aewang from a seven- to a five-reel film. In November 
1926, a third censorship case involved the cutting and re-shooting of about 1,000 feet of 
director Na Un-kyu’s The Boy with Great Ambition (Pungun-a).56  
Around the time of General Ugaki Kazushige’s appointment as governor-general and 
the escalation of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, filmmakers in Korea began to experience 
the tightening of film regulations. This corresponded to Japan’s overall tightening of cultural 
policies and the general oppression of Korean culture during that time. In particular, stricter 
film policies began to shut Korean audiences off from foreign films as a higher exhibition 
quota of Japanese films began to take hold. All aspects of the film industry were now 
subservient to Japan’s Wartime Regime System (Rinsen taisei), which prioritized the war 
effort over all other social, cultural, economic, industrial, and political concerns in ways 
similar to those applied to the German film industry in the lead-up to World War II. 
On April 26, 1933, the governor-general declared Law No. 40. It required that all 
foreign films shown in Korea first be imported into Japan and then later distributed to the 
colony.57 Hollywood’s formerly successful direct distribution strategies were no longer 
possible. The governor-general was attempting to create a stricter approach to the distribution 
and exhibition of foreign—primarily American—films in Korea as part of a larger 
“Surveillance State.”58 Bureaucratic mechanisms now threatened Hollywood’s golden age, 
and the U.S. film industry’s cultural autonomy in the Korean market.59 
By the end of 1934, each imported film was subjected to a system of double 
censorship. First, prints were examined by customs officials at the Japanese port of entry, and 
then examined under closer and more bureaucratic scrutiny at the Japanese Censorship 
Bureau in Tokyo. Locating and deleting “objectionable” (akueikyō) scenes—such as those 
with riots or anti-authority, revolutionary, and communist propaganda—continued to be the 
focus of censorship cuts. The Censorship Board allowed images of naked bodies, but kissing 
was prohibited. Any images or stories offensive to the Japanese Empire or the monarchy 
were strictly prohibited.60 The Russian films Battleship Potemkin and Mother were two such 
films, banned from exhibition in Korea and Japan because of their social and ideological 
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messages.61 Still, only 10 out of about 2,400 imported films were banned in Japan in 1933, 
including 8 American, 1 Russian, and 1 German. Between January and September of 1934, 
only 1 out of 1,954 American films submitted for censorship was banned.62  
A few titles of Warner Bros.–First National Pictures, which received censorship 
approval in 1934 and were in fact screened, included: Footlight Parade, Gold Diggers of 
1933, Captured, I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang, 42nd Street, Crowd Roars, Winner Take 
All, Fashions, Son of a Sailor, Tiger Shark, Central Air Port, Frisco Jenny, Little Giant, and 
Last Flight.63 These were visually entertaining sound films that Korean and Japanese 
audiences could easily appreciate because their narratives relied little on knowledge of the 
English language. Hollywood films were not dubbed into the local language, although it 
would not have been illegal to do so. It was standard practice to add Korean and/or Japanese 
subtitles and other explanatory notes to most prints.64 Censorship applications for all English-
language films required two copies of explanatory notes or the whole dialogue script 
translated into either Japanese or Korean. All intertitles and subtitles had to be provided in 
English, as well as one of the local languages.65 
Ironically, this stricter film policy stimulated Korean film production, as Korean films 
were now categorized as “domestic” (kokusan) films. Through the Governor-General Order 
No. 82, ratified on August 7, 1934, General Ugaki mandated that 25 percent of all pictures 
shown in Korea had to be of domestic origin—that is, of Japanese and/or Korean origin. The 
regulations had a positive impact on the Korean film industry because they gave “hope” to 
filmmakers. 
Another positive outcome for Korean filmmakers in the late 1930s, according to the 
International Cinema Association of Japan, was an expanding exhibition market in Japan 
proper and Manchuria, which was seen as “one of the most hopeful signs for the future of the 
Korean cinema.”66 Although the industry remained unstable primarily because ample and 
continuous funding was lacking, nearly 115 films (including twelve talkies) were produced in 
Korea between 1926 and 1937, making this period Korea’s first golden age of cinema.67 An 
average of one film was made every five weeks, and a new film company was formed each 
time a new production began.68 Korean and Japanese producers and filmmakers utilized this 
one-off funding strategy until 1942, when the Government-General took complete control 
over film production in the Korean colony and consolidated all film companies into the single 
company called Chosŏn Film Production Co. (Chosŏn yŏnghwa chechak chusikhoesa)—
much as Adolf Hitler did in Germany when he assigned Joseph Goebbels to take over the 
UFA studios in 1933. 
Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, Korea’s film culture grew through its ties with 
Japan. Korean filmmakers gained production experience by traveling back and forth to 
Japan.69 For example, Yi Pil-wu—the cinematographer of Korea’s first successful and most 
famous talkie, Chunhyang-chŏn (Story of Chunhyang, 1935), spent time in Osaka studying at 
the film libraries of the Osaka Mainichi newspaper, which opened its doors to commercial 
and artistic filmmakers in July 1927.70 By early 1931, Korean filmmakers no longer needed 
to travel to Japan to gain experience because local branches of the Osaka Mainichi film 
library and training center were opened in Seoul and Daegu. Both libraries were outfitted 
with “well-equipped” projectors and a supply of films from the Mainichi library. Weekly 
screenings of educational and cultural films were arranged at the two Korean branches and 
basic production classes were offered as well.71 The main objective was to: “raise the quality 
of education by films through research and experiments in actual educational and social 
problems.”72 In essence, the Osaka Mainichi library and training program was an innovative 
attempt to coalesce the social and political attitudes and beliefs of all of Japan’s imperial 
subjects. Armed with technical know-how, social/business contacts with Japanese 
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filmmakers, and an intense desire to express themselves through film, Korean filmmakers 
continued to sharpen their production skills and made more films. 
While Korean filmmakers were gaining production experience, producers focused on 
profiting from the exhibition side of the industry. Between August 1, 1926 and March 31, 
1936, Korean entertainment entrepreneurs such as Pak Sŭng-pil, Yi Ku-yŏng, and Cho 
Chung-hwan, as well as producers and directors such as Yi Pil-wu, Kim Dong-pyŏng, and Yi 
Ch’ang-gŭn, applied for approval to exhibit 267 Korean and Japanese films (most likely from 
the smaller Japanese film companies) for entertainment purposes but only one 
nonentertainment contemporary film. Approximately 18.5 percent (50) of these were 
historical entertainment films, while 81.5 percent (217) belonged to the contemporary genre. 
The Censorship Board passed all of the reels of historical-entertainment films without any 
rejections. However, a number of scenes from both the historical and contemporary genre 
were restricted for violating the rules against public peace and public morals. During this 
decade, Korean distribution agents also brought 201 nonfeature Japanese films, such as 
documentaries, public films, and commercial advertisements, and around nine nonfeature 
foreign films before the Censorship Board. Unfortunately, these statistics do not reveal the 
specific names of these films.  
This same group of Korean entertainment entrepreneurs, producers, and directors 
brought an even more impressive 1,850 Hollywood films and 276 entertainment films from 
other countries before the Censorship Board. If all of the approved films had reached cinema 
screens, Koreans would have brought an average of 106 foreign films to Korea per year—
about two per week. Consequently, with the total number of American films directly 
distributed by Hollywood studios, people living in Korea during the colonial period would 
have watched a lot of American films. There may not have been continuous financial support 
for local film production, but there were literally thousands of opportunities to facilitate the 
exhibition of American and other foreign films. 
However, as Hollywood film distributors were forced to import their films to Korea 
via Japan, Korean film companies suffered from a lack of distribution profits and regularized 
funding, especially for the experimentation and conversion to sound-on-disc and sound-on-
film technology. As a result, Japanese film companies with access to ample funds increased 
their distribution opportunities throughout the Korean market. At the same time, the 
governor-general’s policies helped regulate or reduce the penetration of so-called “bad 
culture” in foreign films into the minds of Korean audiences while the Japanese were 
preparing for war.73 The Japanese authority was attempting to use a screen quota to control 
foreign films, which contained potentially influential propaganda.74 Despite this, it was much 
harder to enforce the double censorship policy because of limited human resources. During 
1934, a total of 17,468 film reels were submitted to the Censorship Bureau in Japan; only 
651, or less than 4 percent, were rejected. About 48 percent of those rejected were from the 
United States.75 The Department of Home Affairs in Tokyo, as well as its branch in Seoul, 
simply lacked sufficient censorship staff. For example, in mid-1925, Tokyo’s Censorship 
Board employed forty-four members. According to statistics for the period between 1926 and 
1936, the number of all domestic and foreign films submitted for censorship totaled 
approximately 20,320, amounting to 93,407 reels.76 Censors throughout Japan and Korea 
would have had their hands full and eyes blurred. 
 At the end of 1935, General Ugaki attempted to protect Japan’s domestic film 
industry further by strengthening the laws regarding the market share of domestic films in the 
Korean and Japanese markets. The screen quota system was raised from 25 percent to one-
third, increasing exhibition market barriers for American and European distributors and their 
silent and sound films. One-third of the films screened at any given cinema had to be 
domestic—Japanese or Korean.  
 
 
 10
There was even greater loss of distribution opportunities for foreign film exchanges in 
Korea in early 1937, after General Minami Jirō, the new governor-general, declared that at 
least half of the films screened in Korea had to originate domestically. This had significant 
implications for distributors of American films. The American distributors complained about 
the stringent laws at numerous industry conferences.77 
Finally, on behalf of Hollywood distributors and because of the quota limits placed on 
the number of imported U.S. films and the more stringent censorship regulations, the 
MPPDAA was forced to negotiate its members’ livelihood with the Japanese Department of 
Home Affairs and the Government-General of Chōsen. During this time, according to 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) archive documents, hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in film rental profits were at stake because U.S. films had been screened 
extensively and well attended throughout Japan and Korea. When the Sino-Japanese war 
broke out in 1937, the Japanese Empire was run by the total war system. The Japanese 
government prioritized the protection of its domestic film industry and the education of its 
imperial subjects. In effect, the Government-General no longer needed to profiteer from 
Hollywood censorship applications because it had already made a fortune. In 1938, when the 
film import quota was set at 100 features per year, Hollywood distributors were unable to 
recover the market strength gained from the first golden age of American cinema in Asia. The 
Japanese authority seemed paranoid about the potential for Hollywood films and American 
culture influencing citizens of the Japanese Empire.78 Then, when the United States entered 
World War II, links between the American film industry and the Japanese and Korean 
markets were broken completely; all U.S. films and related materials from local Hollywood 
distribution offices (exchanges) were impounded.79  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
  
 Throughout the colonial period, the production of domestic (Japanese and Korean) 
films as well as the distribution and exhibition of international (American, British, Chinese, 
French, German, Italian, and Russian) films was plentiful. The development and enforcement 
of colonial film policy, including censorship, were designed to manage this active sphere of 
film culture in Korea.  
The Government-General launched strict regulations in the mid-1930s after 
Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige initiated a higher exhibition quota of domestic films, 
while blocking American films.80 Film culture in general was seen as part of a very young 
industry and a new form of cultural expression. Its power to influence the masses and make 
an impact on society was demonstrated by the Japanese authority’s fervor to regulate using 
means similar to those by which they regulated the telecommunications, transportation, 
mining, and agricultural industries. 
The sheer volume of censorship statistics from the period between August 1, 1926 and 
March 31, 1936 is astounding. As expected, the censorship fees generated from processing 
this magnitude of films were likewise impressive. The entire film censorship operation 
exploited the large number of American and Japanese films imported into the colony. In other 
words, the American film industry significantly helped to subsidize the advancement of the 
Government-General of Chōsen’s censorship apparatus. Regrettably, very little funding from 
this windfall was reinvested in the Korean film industry. Rather, a sizable amount of this 
funding was redirected in 1933 to build a new censorship facility. This state-of-the-art 
administrative and screening facility, including new 16mm and 35mm dual sound-on-disc 
and sound-on-film projectors, signalled the expansion of a more lucrative censorship 
business. 
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The screening of more than 6,700 Hollywood films in Korea during the colonial 
period was not a fait accompli. A deeper exploration of the censorship status of all of these 
films is needed elsewhere. It would be revealing to learn more about the specific scenes that 
were cut or limited (seigen) from this larger group of American films that passed 
(ken’etsuzumi). In addition, this total number of films would have included multiple copies of 
the same film, per censorship application requirements. More scrutiny is needed to better 
gauge the actual number of films screened in the Korean market. Further consideration of the 
annual budget belonging to the Government-General’s film censorship apparatus within the 
larger context of the entire colonial administration’s budget is also needed. Nevertheless, the 
censorship apparatus benefited from collecting a mass of application fees while circuitously 
preventing some films from being screened. Without knowing more about the personal 
backgrounds and career paths of the members of the Film Censorship Board, it might be 
unfair to assert that they were unqualified to monitor and manage this highly significant 
cultural industry. However, it is possible to assume that the censors’ subjective decisions 
would have swayed censorship criteria. Their decisions might have been rather crude—
simply based on manifest content. 
My research corroborates the view that Japanese censorship policies in colonial Korea 
were overwhelmingly directed at socialist, Communist, and revolutionary expressions and 
themes, rather than “Western” ones. Perhaps this partly explains why the rate of censorship 
rejection for American films was so low—a claim that complicates how the invention and 
development of cinema affected Korean culture. Here, one might well ask whether the act of 
watching thousands of Hollywood films during the Japanese colonial period constituted, for 
the Koreans, a form of passive resistance. Unfortunately, it is difficult to substantiate this 
specific argument with empirical evidence since there are few available source materials. 
Indeed, a large void exists in the evidence published to date, which documents and analyzes 
the political economy, audience reception, and cultural transformation of the film industry in 
Korea during the colonial period. Archive materials, business records, and government files 
are few and far between, not to mention that few films made in Korea before 1945 exist 
today. More exploratory research is needed in this fascinating area. 
The Government-General permitted Korean filmmakers to create spaces, within 
moderate parameters, to express a national culture and spirit through Korean cinema. This 
continued to be the case until the mid- and late-1930s, when Governors-General Ugaki 
Kazushige and Minami Jirō began tightening the oppression of many facets of Korean 
culture. However, censorship was complicated in Korea because of the potential impact a 
film’s contents had on Korean audiences. By their own admission, the police treated the 
production, distribution, and exhibition of films seriously, given the perceived influence that 
the development of talkie (sound) technology had on Korean society. The Censorship Board 
may have believed that listening to the Korean native tongue on film was the same as 
participating in a cultural nationalistic activity. At the same time, the police recognized that 
Korean films could subvert the colonial agenda, and they viewed them with great seriousness 
as a result.  
Between 1926 and 1936, Korean filmmakers gained the practical production 
experience and technical know-how needed to make their own films. Japanese studios 
successfully expanded their domestic film market, and more importantly, served the imperial 
agenda. Hollywood distributors screened their films—many, many of them—and Hollywood 
experienced its first golden age in Korea. Finally, the Government-General and its censorship 
apparatus benefited from many thousands of censorship application fees. Each of these 
groups and aggregates of individuals struggled to maintain control, to have a cultural impact, 
and to attract audiences. Each player, albeit at different and overlapping times, was at least 
partly successful in gaining valuable ground. 
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Notes 
 
1 The panel offered a complex of insights, ranging from the personal backgrounds and career 
paths of the Japanese and Korean censorship officials, to the relationships between and 
resistance strategies of the printing capital (insoe chabon), the Korean newspaper elite, and 
Japanese authorities. Responses pointed to the current transformations surrounding 
censorship studies. 
2 Makino Mamoru is one of the best-known Japanese experts on early Japanese film culture 
and policy. His particular area of expertise is film censorship. See Makino Mamoru, “On the 
Conditions of Film Censorship in Japan before its Systematization,” trans. Aaron Gerow, in 
Praise of Film Studies: Essays in Honor of Makino Mamoru, ed. Aaron Gerow and Abé Mark 
Nornes (Yokohama: Kinema Club Publications, 2001), 46–67.  
3 For a general overview of the history of Korean cinema in English, see John A. Lent’s 
chapter on “South Korea,” in his The Asian Film Industry (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1990), 122–45; Yi Young-Il and Choe Young-Chol, The History of Korean Cinema (Seoul: 
Jimoondang Publishing, 1998); Hyangjin Lee, Contemporary Korean Cinema: Identity, 
Culture, and Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Kim Hyae-joon, 
“South Korea: The Politics of Memory,” in Being & Becoming: The Cinemas of Asia, ed. 
Aruna Vasudev, Latika Padgaonkar, and Rashmi Doraiswamy (Delhi: Macmillan India, 
2002), 281–300; and Charles K. Armstrong, “The Origins of North Korean Cinema: Art and 
Propaganda in the Democratic People’s Republic,” Acta Koreana 5, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 1–19.  
4 For architectural, electrical, and other pertinent documents, see “Motion Picture Film 
Censorship Building Re-construction Work” (Chōsen Sōtokufu; Katsudō shashin firumu 
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kenetsujo shinchiku kōji), 1933 Financial Year (Shōwa hachi nendo), Government-General of 
Chōsen, File #CJA0012809, Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, 
Government Archives and Records Service, Daejon, Korea (hereafter cited as Archives and 
Records Service). 
5 This 146.45 tsubo (approximately 44.4 square meters) building was constructed on the site 
where the current Kyŏngpok Palace stands in central Seoul. See “Number 21 (Nijūichi), 
Motion Picture Film Censorship Situation” (Katsudō shashin firumu ken’etsu jōkyō), Sixty-
ninth Imperial Parliament Document (Dai rokujūkyū kai Teikoku Gikai Setsumei shiryō), 
Bureau of Police Affairs (Keimu kyoku), 1935, File #CJA0002448, Archives and Records 
Service.  
6 A majority of the censorship statistics cited in this article come from “Table of Censored 
Motion Picture Films, 1 August 1926 to 31 March 1935” (Katsudō shashin firumu ken’etsu 
tōkeihyō, ji Taishō jūgo nen hachigatsu tsuitachi, itaru Shōwa jū nen sangatsu sanjūichinichi), 
Library Section of the Bureau of Police Affairs, Government-General of Chōsen (Chōsen 
Sōtokufu Keimukyoku Toshoka), File #CJA0002448, Archives and Records Service; and 
“Table of Censored Motion Picture Films, 1 April 1935 to 31 March 1936” (Katsudō shashin 
firumu ken’etsu tōkeihyō, ji Shōwa jū nen shigatsu tsuitachi, itaru Shōwa jūichi nen sangatsu 
sanjūichinichi), Library Section of the Bureau of Police Affairs, Government-General of 
Chōsen, File #CJA0002471, Archives and Records Service. 
7 See “Number 21, Motion Picture Film Censorship Situation,” File #CJA0002448, Archives 
and Records Service. 
8 Initially, these figures appeared to be rather large. However, after detailed discussions with 
colonial experts Han Gi-hyeong from Sunkyunkwan University and Han Man-soo from 
Dongguk University, it has become apparent that these figures are significant, but not as big 
within the larger context of the Government-General of Chōsen’s annual budget. 
Nevertheless, the steady stream of annual fees paid for most if not all of the film censorship 
office’s operating expenses, including employee salaries.        
9 See Richard H. Mitchell, Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), 209.  
10 See Koen De Ceuster, “The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in 
South Korea,” Korean Studies 25, no. 2 (2002): 207–42; and Chung Youn-tae, “Refracted 
Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea,” Korea Journal 42, no. 3 
(Autumn 2002): 18–59. 
11 For a revealing study of the history of Hollywood’s global expansion, see the collection of 
essays in “Film Europe” and “Film America”: Cinema, Commerce, and Cultural Exchange, 
1920–1939, ed. Andrew Higson and Richard Maltby (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 
1999); Barry R. Litman, The Motion Picture Mega-Industry (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
1998); Kerry Segrave, American Films Abroad: Hollywood’s Domination of the World’s 
Movie Screens (London: McFarland, 1997); and Jorge A. Schnitman, Film Industries in Latin 
America: Dependency and Development (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1984).  
12 It is no coincidence, then, that 1916 is the year the International Cinema Association of 
Japan—the editors of Cinema Yearbook of Japan published in English—stated that 
permanent film production, distribution, and exhibition began in Korea. This time 
corresponds to the noticeable increase of U.S., Japanese, German, and French films in the 
Korean market, as well as the Korean and Japanese co-production of documentaries and 
travelogue films. See “Motion Picture Production in Korea,” Cinema Yearbook of Japan, 
1938 (Tokyo: Society for International Cultural Relations [Kokusai bunka shinkokai], 1939), 
49–50. 
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13 See Choe Young-chol, “Film Policy under Japanese Colonization” in Understanding 
Korean Cinema: From “Arirang” to “Silver Stallion” (“Ilche Singmin Ch’ihaŭi Yŏnghwa 
Chŏgchaek” in Han’guk yŏnghwaŭi ihae: ‘Arirang’ esŏ ‘Ŭnmanŭn Ochi Annŭnda’ kkachi) 
ed. Sin Ŭnsu (Seoul: Yenni, 1996), 217–42. According to Choe, 1918 marked the beginning 
of film regulation in Korea. That is, the regulation of foreign films specifically began in the 
Korean exhibition market, since the first Korean film, The Righteous Revenge or Loyal 
Revenge (Ŭirichŏk kutu)—a kino-drama—was not made until 1919. 
14 For a review of early Japanese film industry laws, see Makino Mamoru, “On the 
Conditions of Film Censorship in Japan before its Systematization,” in Praise of Film 
Studies, 46–67; Freda Freiberg, “Comprehensive Connections: The Film Industry, the 
Theatre and the State in the Early Japanese Cinema,” Screening the Past 10 (Nov. 2000): 1–
23; and “Japan Rules against Piracy,” Film Year Book 1922–1923 (New York: Wid’s Films 
and Film Folks, 1923), 371. 
15 For a more detailed discussion of Korea’s colonization, see Andrew Nahm, “Korea under 
Japanese Colonial Rule,” Korea Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean 
People, 2nd ed. (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 1996), 223–60. In December 1927, General 
Yamanashi Hanzo replaced Admiral Saitō as governor-general for a short time. Admiral 
Saitō resumed his position as governor-general in August 1929 and was replaced by General 
Ugaki Kazushige in June 1931. General Ugaki served as the governor-general of Chōsen 
from 1931 until August 1936. 
16 See Gregory J. Kasza, The State and Mass Media in Japan, 1918–1945 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988). 
17 It seems that throughout the colonial period, films were screened everywhere and to 
everyone. For example, Hollywood pictures were shown in Korean prisons purely for 
therapeutic purposes. From June 15 to 17, 1936, the P’yŏngyang Constant-Existence 
Foundation (Zaidan-hōjin Heijō Yūkōkai) sponsored “rehabilitation” evenings by screening 
Twentieth Century Fox/United Artists hit Les Miserables (directed by Richard Boleslawski, 
1935) for the male and female Korean inmates of P’yŏngyang Prison. According to the 
event’s posters, the foundation aimed to use this film along with various other Japanese 
shorts to educate inmates about preventing and eliminating crime in society. See 
correspondence from the governor of P’yŏngyang Prison (Heijō keimushochō) to the chief of 
sentence enforcement (Gyōkeikachō), “Holding the Rehabilitation Propaganda Motion 
Pictures Sessions” (Hogo shisō senden katsudō shashin kai kaisai ni kansuru ken) and 
“Motion Picture Screening for Safeguarding Ideology” (Bohosasang Sŏnjŏn Hwaldong 
Sachinhoe Kaech’oe e kwanhan Kŏn), 1936, File #CJA0004316, Archives and Records 
Service.  
18 Freiberg, “Comprehensive Connections”; and “Japan Rules against Piracy”, 371. 
19 “Censorship—Japan,” Film Year Book 1926 (New York: Wid’s Films and Film Folks, 
1926), 820. 
20 See Chosen Motion Picture Notes and Supplementary Materials, Records of the U.S. 
Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1930–1939, File 895, 
Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration (31/3/1934), 3; and 
Chosen Motion Picture Control Ordinance, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating 
to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1930–1939, File 895. Washington, D.C.: National Archives 
and Records Administration (8/9/34). 
21 Examples of differences between provincial police chiefs are referenced in “The Foreign 
Market—Tokio,” Wid’s Year Book 1920–1921 (New York: Wid’s Films and Film Folks, 
1921), 275. 
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22 In some cases, fees were eliminated when the Censorship Board or the governor-general 
deemed it necessary or “when it would be considered a public service to do so.” This clause 
gave special preferences to filmmakers whose work glorified imperial Japan and pleased the 
police in the process. See Film Year Book 1926 (New York: Wid’s Films and Film Folks, 
1926), 820. 
23 See Kristin Thompson, Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market 
1907–34 (London: British Film Institute, 1985), 45.  
24 Thompson, Exporting Entertainment, 45. 
25 For a detailed discussion of Naisen ittai, see Carter J. Eckert, “Class Over Nation: Naisen 
Ittai and the Korean Bourgeoisie,” in Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the 
Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1991), 224–52.  
26 See Carter J. Eckert, Ki-Baek Lee, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. 
Wagner, Korea Old and New: A History (Ilchokak: Seoul, 1990), 282. 
27 The phrase “node of cultural construction” is from Michael E. Robinson, “Broadcasting in 
Korea, 1924–1937: Colonial Modernity and Cultural Hegemony,” in Japan’s Competing 
Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900–1930, ed. Sharon A. Minichiello 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 358–78. 
28 Kino-dramas mixed live theater, still photographs, and filmed sequences on a single stage. 
The Righteous Revenge or Loyal Revenge (Ŭirichŏk kutu) was a story about a family dispute 
over property. It was shown in public on October 27, 1919. Since 1966, Korea has celebrated 
its annual national film day on October 27 to honor the birth of the Korean cinema. However, 
it is best not to refer to Ŭirichŏk kutu as the “first” Korean film as this is a hotly debated topic 
among Korean scholars. For a discussion of this film and other examples of early Korean 
cinema, see See Yi and Choe, The History of Korean Cinema, 25–40; You Hyun Mok, 
History of Korean Film Development (Han’guk yŏnghwa paldalsa) (Seoul: Ch’aengnuri, 
1997); and Kim Chong-wŏn and Chŏng Chung-hŏn, 100 Years of Our Film (Uri yŏnghwa 
100nyŏn) (Seoul: Hyŏnamsa, 2001).  
29 Academy of the Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Library Archives (AMPAS), MPAA 
Censorship Regulations—Foreign, File #7, Censorship Reports: Japan. 501. 
30 See “Future Outlook—Conditions in Oriental Territories,” Film Year Book 1925 (New 
York: Wid’s Films and Film Folks, 1925), 663–66; and “The Foreign Market: Japan,” Film 
Year Book 1926 (New York: Wid’s Films and Film Folks, 1926), 657, 820, 860. In Japan, a 
large combine was formed in mid-1924 between the Japan Moving Picture Producing Co., 
Shochiku Cinema Co., Teikoku Cinema Co., and Makino Moving Picture Producing Co. The 
combine’s primary aim was to develop and improve self-censorship standards and lobby the 
government for lower tax obligations. One of the combine’s first strategic actions was an 
organized boycott of American films. The boycott proved to be a failure because it only 
lasted about two weeks, and never made it to the Korean market. Apparently, Japanese 
audiences preferred Hollywood films to Japanese films. Because of this temporary embargo, 
Japanese exhibitors lost more business than American distributors. The Japanese cohort also 
aimed collectively to increase its export opportunities in Korea and in other overseas markets.  
31 I am not convinced that Saitō was entirely an enlightened liberal. He was, after all, a strict 
regulator and the police presence in Korea did increase during his regime. However, his 
actions can be read in multiple ways. He simply may have been a canny cultural 
administrator who saw that Japan’s film industry could benefit if film production and 
distribution activities in Korea eased off.  
32 For an analysis of the Korean business elite, see Changzoo Song, “Business Elite and the 
Construction of National Identity in Korea,” Acta Koreana 6, no. 2 (July 2003): 55–86; and 
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Dennis McNamara, “The Keishō and the Korean Business Elite,” Journal of Asian Studies 
48, no. 2 (May 1989): 310–23.  
33 Titles of Korean film journals and magazines include Samch’ŏlli, Movie Age (Yŏnghwa 
sidae), Korean Film (Chosŏn yŏnghwa), and Popular Film (Daechung yŏnghwa). 
Newspapers such as Dong-a Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, and Maeil Shinbo also carried film-related 
stories, editorials, photos of film people, and advertisements. 
34 Tadasi Iizima, “Documentary Films,” in Cinema Yearbook of Japan, 1936–1937 (Tokyo: 
Sanseido, 1937), 58–60. 
35 On June 2, 1927 the chief of the Bureau of Internal Affairs of the Government-General of 
Chōsen (Naimu kyokuchō) sent a catalog of some of these genre films to the mayor of each 
municipality (fuin). See correspondence regarding “Motion Picture Distribution” (Katsudō 
shashin eiga haifu kata no ken) in “The List of Films in the Custody of the Government-
General” (Chōsen Sōtokufu naimukyoku hokan eiga mokuroku), File #CJA0019728, 
Archives and Records Service. Additional details concerning these film genres can be found 
in a 1937 16mm film library catalog, which the Government-General kept among its film 
distribution and exhibition records. See Jūroku miri Eiga sōmokuroku, edited and published 
by the Section of Film Promotion, Fukada Ltd & Co. (Henshū ken hakkōnin: Fukada Shōkai 
Eigabu Sendenka), Hakkōjo: Fukada Shōkai Eigabu Ōsaka sakai-suji Honchō kōsaten), File 
#CJA0019728, Archives and Records Service. 
36 A two-reel film called Kokumin kaiyei (Let Every Japanese Learn to Swim), a one-reel 
L’Art des Fleurs au Japon (The Floral Art of Japan), and Aki no sanya (Secret of Nature in 
Autumn) were three popular cultural films released in 1937. See Takao Itagaki, “Cultural 
Films,” Cinema Yearbook of Japan, 1938, 44–46.  
37 An excellent discussion of these film types can be found in Peter B. High, The Imperial 
Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931–1945 (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2003); and Abé Mark Nornes, Japanese Documentary Film: The Meiji 
Era through Hiroshima (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).  
38 According to exchange rates published in July 1966 by the Bank of Japan, 100 Yen traded 
for an average of $46.875 US dollar in New York in 1926 and $28.951 in 1936. 
39 Foreign Market Reports, “Japan,” Film Year Book 1927 (New York: Wid’s Films and Film 
Folks, 1927), 970–71; “Japan,” Film Daily Year Book 1928 (New York: J.W. Alicoate, 
1928), 969; “Japan,” Film Daily Year Book 1929 (New York: J.W. Alicoate, 1929), 1033–36; 
“Japan,” Film Daily Year Book of Motion Pictures 1933 (New York: Film Daily, 1933), 
1003; and “Japan,” Film Daily Year Book of Motion Pictures 1934 (New York: Film Daily, 
1934), 1037–38. 
40 In Japan, owners paid 5 sen per 3 meters of original film and 2 sen per 3 meters of the 
second copy of the film. See Chosen Motion Picture Notes, Records of the U.S. Department 
of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1930–1939, (31/3/1934): S1–4.  
41 See Foreign Market Reports, “Chosen (Korea),” Film Daily Year Book of Motion Pictures 
1939 (New York: Film Daily, 1939), 1174; and “Chosen (Korea),” Film Daily Year Book of 
Motion Pictures 1940 (New York: Film Daily, 1940), 1103–4. 
42 See Chosen Motion Picture Control Ordinance (8/9/34), 2; and Nathan D. Golden, “Review 
of Foreign Film Markets during 1937—Chosen (Korea),” Film Daily Year Book of Motion 
Pictures 1938 (New York: Film Daily, 1938), 1191–93. 
43 Records from the Warner Bros. Archives at the School of Cinema-Television, University 
of Southern California, indicate that First National began distributing its films directly to the 
Korean market on January 1, 1928. See File: Japan #13101A. 
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44 This momentous fact is commonly overlooked in most recent studies and discussions of the 
contemporary Korean Screen Quota System debate and the 1988 (re)opening of the Korean 
market to the direct distribution of U.S. films. 
45 See Annual Report on Administration of Chosen, 1923–24 (Seoul: Government General of 
Chosen, 1925), 28. 
46 As early as 1923, it was estimated that approximately 76,000 out of a total of 288,000 (26 
percent) of the population in Seoul alone was Japanese. The southernmost port city of Busan 
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